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I. INTRODUCTION
Countless states, counties, and other political subdivisions have
enacted laws designed to protect the public from abusive and
fraudulent solicitation practices in order to maintain public confi-
dence in charities and to promote the public welfare.' Such gov-
ernmental regulations are within the ambit of the state's police
power and are generally held to be valid unless they conflict with
constitutionally protected rights.2
1. See, e.g., Heritage Village Church and Missionary Fellowship v. North Caro-
lina, 40 N.C. App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979), affid, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 726
(1980), where the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a state law es-
sentially identical to the pertinent provision in Larson v. Valente, 102 S.Ct.
1673 (1982), worked an establishment of religion under Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971). See infra note 7.
2. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 567 (1981), affd, 102 S.Ct. 1673 (1982).
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Challenges to laws regulating public disclosure of charitable so-
licitation have traditionally been founded upon the free exercise3
and free speech 4 clauses of the first amendment.5 But recently, in
Larson v. Valente,6 the plaintiff challenged such a regulatory
scheme by asserting that it violated not only the free exercise and
free speech clauses, but the establishment clause as well.
In Larson, the Court held that the tests enunciated in the semi-
nal establishment clause case, Lemon v. Kurtzman,7 were applica-
ble to laws "affording a uniform benefit to all religions."8 Where
an aid or benefit was not evident, but government regulations cre-
ated denominational preferences by imposing burdensome re-
quirements on some religions while exempting others, the Court
held that the proper standard of review was strict scrutiny.9 Thus,
the proper inquiry in these cases is whether the regulation of char-
itable solicitations is closely fitted to the furtherance of a compel-
3. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the state
may regulate the time, place, and manner of solicitation).
In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the Court considered the
constitutionality of a law requiring the payment of a fee as a condition prece-
dent to the issuance of a solicitation license. The Court held:
[the fee] is a flat license tax, the payment of which is a condition of
the exercise of these constitutional privileges. The power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppres its enjoy-
ment .... Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form
of missionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not
have a full purse.... A state may not impose a charge for the enjoy-
ment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.
Id. at 112-13 (citation omitted). Under the Court's analysis in Murdock, NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-1440 (1980), which requires the payment of a one dollar fee to
the secretary of state as a condition precedent to the issuance of a certificate
authorizing solicitation, is a blatant violation of the free exercise clause.
4. See, e.g., Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 444 U.S. 620
(1980).
5. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. L The first
amendment is applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment. Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108 (1943).
6. 102 S.Ct. 1673 (1982).
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The traditional test for the establishment of religion was
stated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three
such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion...
finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive entanglement with
religion."
Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted).
8. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1687 (1982) (emphasis in original).
9. Id. at 1684-85.
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ling state interest.' 0
The Larson decision is important because it reveals the dual
nature of the establishment clause: the clause applies when bene-
fits are accorded to religions by governmental action and when
laws place burdens on some religions while exempting others."
Larson is unique because it represents the first occasion that the
Court has applied the strict scrutiny analysis to governmental ac-
tion under the establishment clause.12 This Note analyzes the is-
sues raised in Larson and discusses the implications of the
adoption of the strict scrutiny standard of review in cases of de-
nominational preferences.
IL THE LARSON CASE
A. The Lower Courts
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature modified portions of the
state's Charitable Solicitation Act.' 3 The Act, which was designed
to protect the public against fraudulent solicitation and to main-
tain faith in charitable causes,1 4 exempted 5 all religious organiza-
tions from its extensive registration' 6 and annual reporting' 7
10. Id. at 1685.
11. Since the religion clauses necessarily overlap, the traditional method used to
distinguish between those factual scenarios that required analysis under the
establishment clause and free exercise clause was that the former proved
useful in adjudicating aid to religions while the latter was best suited to dis-
cern impermissible burdens on religions. While the Larson decision unfortu-
nately obfuscates this distinction, it also heralds the heretofore undiscovered
dual utility of the establishment clause.
12. "[N] otions of compelling justification have been employed only in free exer-
cise cases; government actions have been deemed either violative of the anti-
establishment principle or not-the balancing process in that setting has
been incorporated into the definitions of the terms themselves." L. TRIBE,
AmERczAm CONSTITUTONAL LAw 846-47 n.1 (1978).
13. MImN. STAT. §§ 309.50-309.61 (1980) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
14. All registration and reporting materials submitted under the Act become
public records. MI. STAT. § 309.54(1) (1980). These records "May assist in
preventing fraud by informing the public of ways in which their contributions
will be employed." Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 637 (1980) (footnote omitted).
15. The exemption may be revoked if the organization employs a professional
fund raiser, MmN. STAT. § 309.515-2 (1980), or the organization has had its ex-
empt status revoked by the Department of Commerce "as the department
may deem necessary to protect the public interest," Mum. STAT. § 309.515-3
(1980), and if the applicant has filed a false statement or "has engaged in a
fraudulent, deceptive or dishonest practice," MINN. STAT. § 309.532-1(b)
(1980).
16. Registration under the Act requires the disclosure of information such as the
name of the organization; its address; where its books and records are kept;
names and addresses of officers, directors, trustees, and the chief executive;
tax exempt status; purpose for which solicitations will be used; and methods
of solicitation. MmN. STAT. § 309.52-1 (1980).
17. Almost all organizations which are required to register must also file an an-
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requirements. The amendments to the Act substantially narrowed
the availability of the religious exemption18 by imposing certain
registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious
organizations that solicited more than fifty percent of their funds
from nonmembers.19
The controversy in Larson arose when the Minnesota Depart-
ment of Commerce "notified the appellee Holy Spirit Association
for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) that
it was required to register under the Act .... -"20 Pamela Valente
and other followers of the tenets of the Unification Church filed
suit seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief.21 The ap-
pellees alleged that the Act abridged their first amendment rights
of free speech and free exercise of religion 22 and their fourteenth
nual report. The report must include total income from all sources; costs of
management, fund raising, and public education; the amount of funds trans-
ferred outside of the state with an explanation as to recipient and purpose;
and the amount expended in the state broken down as to each major purpose.
All of this data must be contained in a financial statement. MINN. STAT.
§ 309.53 (Supp. 1981).
18. The exemption of any organization may be revoked if it expends an unrea-
sonable amount on administrative expenses. Administrative costs are pre-
sumed unreasonable when they exceed thirty percent. MiNN. STAT. § 309.555-
1(a) (1980). Since the Court in Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't., 444 U.S. 620 (1980) held that a municipal ordinance, which prohibited
solicitation by charities that do not use at least seventy-five percent of their
receipts for charitable purposes, was unconstitutional on its face, then the
analogous Minnesota statutory provision is arguably unconstitutional. See
also National Found. v. Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1969).
19. The Act exempted the following from its registration and reporting
requirements:
[a] religious society or organization which received more than half of
the contributions it received in the accounting year last ended
(1) from persons who are members of the organization or (2) from a
parent organization or affiliated organization; or (3) from a combina-
tion of the sources listed in clauses (1) and (2). A religious society or
organization which solicits from its religious affiliates who are quali-
fied under this subdivision and who are represented in a body or con-
vention is exempt from the requirements of sections 309.52 and
309.53. The term "member" shall not include those persons who are
granted a membership upon making a contribution as a result of a
solicitation.
MN. STAT. § 309.515-1(b) (1980) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 14-
18.
20. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1677.
21. Id. at 1677. The defendants/appellants in Larson, John Larson, Commis-
sioner of Securities, and Warren Spannus, Attorney General, were charged
with enforcement of the Act by virtue of their offices. The Unification Church
was later joined as a plaintiff by stipulation. Id.
22. The district court denied the church's motion for summary judgment on the
[Vol. 62:359
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amendment right to equal protection of the laws.23 Moreover, the
appellees contended that the Act violated the establishment
clause by discriminating among religions. 24 The district court, re-
lying upon recommendations of a magistrate, held the Act
unconstitutional.2 5
"On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part."26 The court affirmed
the district court's use of the overbreadth doctrine27 to provide the
church with standing and concluded that "[t] he statutory discrimi-
nation between such organizations smacks of 'religious gerryman-
dering,' an apparently intentional favoritism for the religious
organizations obtaining some but less than half of their funds from
the public."23
free exercise and free speech claims. Petition for Rehearing at 5 n.2, Larson
v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982).
23. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1677.
24. In its motion for summary judgment, the Church alleged that the exemption
provision of the Act violated the establishment clause by discriminating
among religions. Id. at 1678. The state, in order to counter the free speech
and free exercise claims, maintained that the Church's activities were not
religious in nature, and therefore unprotected. The state presented "numer-
ous affidavits of persons claiming to be former members of the Unification
Church, who asserted that they had been encouraged to engage in fund rais-
ing practices that were both fraudulent and unrelated to any religious pur-
pose." Id. at 1678 n.5.
25. The court held that the Act "failed the second of the three Establishment
Clause 'tests' set forth by [the] court in Lemon v. Kurtzman." Larson v. Va-
lente, 102 S. Ct. at 1678 (citation omitted). The second test requires that the
"principal or primary effect" of the challenged statute "be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 601, 612 (1971).
The Lemon tests are set forth in note 7, supra.
26. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1679. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision is Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1981).
27. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 565. The overbreadth doctrine holds that "a
litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a
statute by showing that it substantially abridges the first amendment rights
of other parties not before the court." Id. (quoting Village of Schaumberg v.
Citizens for a Better Env't., 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) (citations omitted)). The
overbreadth doctrine is applicable only to noncommercial speech and should
not be relied upon to establish standing for an establishment clause claim
since the Supreme Court eschewed the use of the doctrine and undertook a
traditional analysis of standing in Larson.
28. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1981) (footnote omitted). In Gil-
lette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) the term "religious gerrymandering"
was used "to describe a 'subtle departure from neutrality' between sects."
Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d 562, 566 n.4 (8th Cir. 1981) (citing Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437,452 (1971)). Strangely, while the Supreme Court directly
equates a religious gerrymander with excessive entanglement of government
with religion, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1688, the court of appeals failed
to recognize that the political divisiveness caused by gerrymandering consti-
tuted excessive entanglement. Although the court of appeals concluded that
1983]
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The court of appeals analyzed the Act with respect to the com-
mands of the establishment clause and found that the Act passed
scrutiny under the first of the Lemon criteria because, "viewed as a
whole, [it] ha[d] a valid secular purpose."29 However, when the
second of the Lemon tests was applied,30 the court held that the
Act constituted an unconstitutional establishment of religion be-
cause the statutory classification assisted those religious organiza-
tions which were exempted from the registration and reporting
requirements and placed an impermissible burden on those which
merely happened to solicit the majority of their funds from the
public.3 ' Having found that the challenged exemption was uncon-
stitutional under the second Lemon test, the court opined that it
was unnecessary to consider the third test.
32
In concluding that the fifty percent rule was unconstitutional, 33
the court rejected the state's argument "that a generally valid sec-
ular purpose, such an avoidance of unnecessary regulation, defeats
an establishment clause challenge to a statute, even though the
a gerrymander had occurred, it characterized the application of excessive en-
tanglement test as being unnecessary because the Act was unconstitutional
under the first and second prongs of the Lemon tests. Valente v. Larson, 637
F.2d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 1981). Apparently, the court did not fully comprehend
the inquiry of the Lemon tests. See supra note 7.
The court of appeals also stated:
[I] t may be inferred that the draftsmen of this legislation wished to
reduce the burdens otherwise imposed on well-established churches
which had achieved strong but not total financial support from their
members; the draftsmen have exhibited less concern for easing regu-
lations applicable to churches which are new, or which, as a matter of
policy may favor public solicitation over general reliance on financial
support from members. Actual discrimination exists if, as we as-
sume, there are church organizations in both categories .... In the
absence of argument to the contrary from state officials here, we...
[so assume] and conclude that real discrimination exists.
Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d, 562, 566 (8th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added). Adjudi-
cation of constitutional magnitude should show no quarter to assumptions of
impermissible legislative discrimination when that very assumption is the
gravamen of the inquiry to be made. "Inquiries into congressional motives or
purposes are a hazardous matter." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383
(1968).
29. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 567.
30. See supra note 7.
31. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 568.
32. Id. at 569.
Although the court of appeals agreed with the district court that the Act
violated the establishment clause, it held that application of the Minnesota
rule of severability compelled the result that the fifty percent rule should be
stricken from § 309.515-1(b) rather than striking the entire exemption provi-
sion as the district court had done. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 570. See
MiN. STAT. § 309.61 (1980).
33. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 567.
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burdens may fall more heavily on certain religious groups." 34 The
court said:
The challenged statute in this case expressly separates two classes of reli-
gious organizations and makes the separation for no valid secular purpose
that has been suggested by the [the state] .... Inexplicable disparate
treatment will not generally be attributed to accident; it seems much more
likely that at some stage of the legislative process special solicitude for
particular religious organizations affected the choice of statutory lan-
guage. The resulting discrimination is constitutionally invidious.
3 5
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The first issue addressed by the United States Supreme Court
was whether the appellees had standing to sue. The state asserted
that since the Unification Church had not proven itself to be a reli-
gious organization within the meaning of the Act, it was without
standing to challenge an exemption applicable only to religious or-
ganizations even if the fifty percent rule of section 309.515-1(b) was
declared unconstitutional. 36 The Court said that since the state
had attempted to enforce the Act via the fifty percent rule of sec-
tion 309.515-1(b),37 it was estopped, at least for the purposes of this
suit, from denying that the appellees were a religious organiza-
tion.38 The Court concluded that the appellees had established the
requisite elements of standing because the threatened application
of section 309.515-1(b) constituted "a distinct and palpable in-
34. Id.
35. Id. at 568.
36. The church had not proven itself to be a religious organization within the
meaning of the Act and would, therefore, not be automatically entitled to an
exemption if the fifty percent rule were declared invalid because the modified
exemption, by its terms, would be applicable only to a religious organization.
See infra note 66.
37. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1681.
38. The basis for the Court's conclusion is the language of the state's letter to the
Church. See Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1677 n.4. Since the exemption
applied only to religious organizations, an attempt to compel the Unification
Church's compliance with the Act via the fifty percent rule necessarily as-
sumed that the Unification Church was indeed a religious organization. The
Court acknowledged that
[t]he Church may indeed be compelled, ultimately, to register under
the Act on some ground other than the fifty percent rule, and while
this fact does affect the nature of the relief that can properly be
granted to appellees on the present record, it does not deprive this
Court of jurisdiction to hear the present case.
Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1682 (citation omitted). The appellants argued
that the only conclusion which could be drawn from the letter was that the
Unification Church was not considered to be a religious organization since
after the enactment of the 1978 amendments, inquiry into the religious nature
of any organization which solicited the majority of its funds from the public
was superfluous. Petition for Rehearing at 2-5, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct.
1673 (1982).
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jury"39 to which meaningful relief could be given.40
Having concluded that the Unification Church satisfied the
standing requirement, the Court turned to the merits of the case.
The state's principal contention was that a law may have a dispa-
rate impact on religious organizations without offending the estab-
lishment clause as long as the differentiating criteria were neutral
and secularly based.41 The Court dismissed this claim in a foot-
note,42 stating that section 309.515-1(b) "makes explicit and deliber-
39. Larson v. Valente, 102, S. Ct. at 1681. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env't.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
40. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1682. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, Justice O'Connor, and Justice White dissented on the issue of
standing. Justice Rehnquist would have held that the appellees had no
standing to challenge the exemption of MmN. STAT. § 309.515-1(b) (1980) be-
cause they had not proven they were a religious organization within its mean-
ing. Consequently, if the church should fail to meet its burden of proof, see
infra note 66, the decision of the majority would not redress any harm done
to the Unification Church, since the church would fall within the general re-
gistration provision of the Act by virtue of its being a charitable, as distin-
guished from a religious, organization. Justice Rehnquist therefore
characterized the majority opinion as possibly being advisory in nature. Lar-
son v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1693-98 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). The majority
did not believe it necessary to relieve every possible harm that may befall the
Church and the redressing the harm caused via the threatened application of
MmN. STAT. § 309.515-1(b) (1980) was constitutionally sufficient. Larson v.
Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1682.
41. The State relied on Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971), for the propo-
sition that disparate impact of legislative acts is not per se unconstitutional
so long as there is a neutral secular basis for the legislative classification and
there is no facial discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation or belief.
Gillette involved a challenge to § 6 (j) of the Military Selective Service Act
of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1976), on the basis that exempting persons from
conscription because they held deep objections to war in any form, but not
exempting those who objected only to "unjust" wars on religious grounds,
constituted a preference for some religions over others in violation of the es-
tablishment clause. The Court upheld the statute opining that "[t]he critical
weakness of petitioners establishment claim rises from the fact that § 6(j), on
its face, simply does not discriminate on the basis of religious affiliation or
religious belief, apart of course from beliefs concerning war." 401 U.S. at 450.
In Larson, the State of Minnesota desired to substitute "the Act" for "§ 6(j)"
and "solicitation"for "war." The Court distinguished Gillette because § 6(j)
of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, "focused on individual conscien-
tious belief not on sectarian affiliation." Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1684
n.23 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. at 455). In doing so the Court
intimates that the Act in question employs a differential treatment on the
basis of sectarian affiliation and not, as the state contended, on the neutral
secular grounds of the sources of the religious organization's funding. Thus,
the focal point of the Court's analysis lies beyond the face of the statute and
concentrates instead upon its effect and application. The Act "focuses pre-
cisely and solely upon religious organizations." Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct.
at 1685 n.23.
42. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1684 n.23.
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ate distinctions" 43 between traditional churches that are primarily
funded by the contributions of members and those churches that
solicit the preponderance of their funds from nonmembers be-
cause they are less well established or because of their religious
beliefs.4 4
Having summarily dismissed the state's main argument, the
Court reiterated the most fundamental command of the establish-
ment clause: denominational neutrality.45 Noting that the religion
clauses of the first amendment necessarily overlap, the Court
stated that the "constitutional prohibition of denominational pref-
erences was inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of
the Free Exercise Clause."4 6 The Court also said that neutrality
among religions was closely intertwined with equal protection.
47
Consistent with these statements, the Court described the analyti-
cal scheme to be utilized when a state46 law created a denomina-
tional preference: the Court must "treat the law as suspect...
43. Id. (emphasis added). It is obvious that the Court views the effect of the Act
as intentional.
44. See id.
45. 'The clearest command of the establishment clause is that one religious de-
nomination cannot be officially preferred over another." Larson v. Valente,
102 S. Ct. at 1683. In support of this point the court cited Epperson v. Arkan-
sas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 106 (1968) ("The first amendment mandates governmen-
tal neutrality between religion and religion.... The State may not adopt
programs or practices... which 'aid or oppose' any religion.... This prohi-
bition is absolute."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ('The govern-
ment must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."). The
Court has never adopted a policy of absolute strict neutrality regarding the
establishment clause, but in the context of denominational preferences the
Larson case seems to indicate the shift of the Court to stricter neutrality
than the past. Indeed since the application of strict scrutiny in Larson, the
Court has two standards of review for the establishment clause and the
newer standard is of a much higher magnitude than the older. For a proposal
of strict neutrality as a starting point in analysis of the religion clauses, see
Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHL L REV. 1
(1961), reprinted in P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 18 (1962).
46. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1683. "Free exercise... can guaranteed only
when legislators-and voters--are required to accord their own religions the
very same treatment given to small, new or unpopular denominations." Id.
'The fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government...
effect no favortism among sects ... and that it work deterrence to no reli-
gious belief." Id. at 1684 (quoting Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
302, 305 (1963)).
47. "[T]here is no more effective practical guarantee against arbitrary and unrea-
sonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally." Larson v. Va-
lente, 102 S. Ct. at 1863-84 (quoting Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336
U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
48. The decision does not compel a narrow reading of the word "state." Indeed
actions of any governmental subdivision are subject to constitutional
limitations.
1983]
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[and] apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality." 49
The standard of review in such cases required the invalidation of
laws creating denominational preferences unless the state was
able to prove that the law was closely fitted50 to the furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest.
51
In Larson, the Court assumed arguendo that the Act was ad-
dressed to a sufficiently compelling governmental interest of pro-
tecting the citizens of Minnesota from abusive and fraudulent
solicitation practices. 52 Therefore, the Court proceeded to deter-
mine whether the Act was closely fitted to its asserted interest.
The state claimed that since Minnesota law provided for the
disclosure of a nonprofit corporation's financial records to mem-
bers,5 3 the need for public disclosure of the information increased
49. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1684. Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of
review in constitutional law and is coupled with a compelling state interest
analysis.
50. Id. at 1685.
51. Id. Formerly the concept of compelling justifications was applicable only to
free exercise cases. Larson is the first case to use the analysis in terms of the
establishment clause. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
52. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685. The Court held that the state had only a
"significant interest." It did not hold that Minnesota's interest was compel-
ling in the context of the establishment clause. Id. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940) (in the free exercise context a statute must be
narrowly drawn to punish specific conduct).
In Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1982), the University of Missouri at
Kansas City had a compelling interest in maintaining the degree of separa-
tion of church and state required by the establishment clause, but to over-
come the plaintiff's claim that exclusion of religious groups from meeting in
university buildings on the basis of religious content constituted a violation
of their rights of free exercise, the university had to demonstrate that its reg-
ulations were closely fitted to further the compelling interest. The university
was unable to meet the burden of showing that its regulations, which main-
tained a degree of separation greater than that required by the establishment
clause, were closely fitted to maintaining the lesser degree of separation that
the establishment clause required. Hence, plaintiffs, a religious organization,
were permitted to use university buildings for their meetings. Thus the stan-
dard of review in Larson appears essentially identical to the free exercise
content-based exclusion standard utilized in Widmar.
53. MrmN. STAT. § 317.28 (2)-(3) (1980) provides:
(2) A member, his agent or his attorney, may inspect all books and
records for any proper purpose at any reasonable time.
(3) Upon request by a member, the domestic corporation shall fur-
nish the member with a statement showing the financial result of all
operations and transactions affecting income and surplus during its
last annual accounting period and a balance sheet containing a sum-
mary of its assets and liabilities as of the closing date of such ac-
counting period.
Id.
Some Courts have determined that members have a right to inspect
financial records or books by virtue of common law. See Appellant's Reply
[Vol. 62:359
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as the percentage of nonmembers' contributions increased. In-
deed, "[t] he particular point at which public disclosure should be
required... is a determination for the legislature. In this case,
the Act's 'majority' distinction is a compelling point, since it is at
this point that the organization becomes predominantly public-
funded."54
Working from this assertion, the Court dissected the appellant's
argument into three premises and analyzed each premise sepa-
rately in order to assess its validity. The three premises were
that members of a religious organization can and will exercise superVision
and control over the organization's solicitation activities when member-
ship contributions exceed fifty percent; that membership control, assum-
ing its existence, is an adequate safeguard against abusive solicitations
... ; and that the need for public disclosure rises in proportion with the
percentage of nonmember contributions.
55
The Court dismissed the first premise as being without merit
because there was no substantial support in the record for the the-
ory that members would control the organization's solicitation
practices when they contributed the majority of the funds.56 Simi-
larly, the second premise was found to be meritless since there
was no reason to believe that members of exempted organizations
have any greater incentive to protect the public than those who
were not exempted.5 7 Finally, the third premise was found to be
without merit because the need for public disclosure arguably
rises more in relation to the absolute amount of public contribu-
Brief at 11, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982); See H. OLEc, NON-
PROFIr COPORATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONs 395 (4th ed. 1980).
54. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 29).
Consider Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't., 444 U.S. 620
(1980):
Efforts to promote disclosure of the finances of charitable organiza-
tions also may assist in preventing fraud by informing the public of
the ways in which their contributions will be employed. Such meas-
ures may help make contribution decisions more informed, while
leaving to individual choice the decision whether to contribute to or-
ganizations that spend large amounts on salaries and administrative
expenses.
Id. at 637-38 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Court cited with ap-
proval ILu. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 5102 (a) (1977) which has disclosure provisions
substantially identical to those at issue in Larson without the fifty percent
rule. Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. at 638 n. 12.
Thus, the Court is not concerned in its inquiry with what must be disclosed,
but which organizations are required to disclose and which are exempted
from the same.
55. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685 (emphasis on the word "percentage" in
original, other emphasis is added).
56. Id. at 1685-86.
57. Id. at 1686.
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tions than with the percentage of public contributions. 8 Since the
acceptance of all three premises was necessary for the state's argu-
ment, the Court concluded "that appellants have failed to demon-
strate that the fifty percent rule in § 309.515-1(b) is 'closely fitted' to
further a 'compelling governmental interest.' "59
Although the Court had already found the fifty percent rule to
be unconstitutional because it was not closely fitted to the further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest,60 the Court examined
the fifty percent rule in light of the Lemon tests.6 1 The Court ap-
plied the Lemon tests not because they were "necessary to the dis-
position of the case ... [but because] those tests... reflect[ed]
the same concerns that warranted the application of strict scrutiny
.... "62 The Court found that the Act was fraught with the danger
of "politicizing religion,"63 since the history of the Act revealed
that the Minnesota Legislature had discussed 64 "the characteris-
58. Id. at 1686-87. The Court did not express an opinion on whether an absolute
amount exemption would be constitutional. Id. at 1687 n.27.
59. Id. at 1687. "As our citations of Allen and Walz indicate, the Lemon 'tests' are
intended to apply to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not
to provisions, like § 309.515-1(b)'s fifty percent rule, that discriminate among
religions." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Allen v. Board of Educ., 392 U.S.
236 (1968) (loaning textbooks to all students, whether they attended public or
private schools, did not work an establishment of religion); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (uniform exemption from property taxation for
all property used solely for religious worship did not violate the establish-
ment clause)). For a brief discussion of the Lemon tests see supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
60. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1687.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The Act " 'engender[s] a risk of politicizing religion'-a risk, indeed, that
has already been substantially realized." Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970)). See generally, L. TiuBE, AMERICAN CONSTrTnmONAL
LAW § 14-12 (1978). For a critical analysis of the political divisiveness test, see
Comment, Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of
the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205
(1980).
64. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1688. The comments made by the two legisla-
tors cited by the Court occurred in one of the ten sessions of discussion of the
1978 amendments to the Act. The only sect actually mentioned during the
debate as justification for the amendment was the Roman Catholic affiliated
Pallotines. Petition for Rehearing at 6-7, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673
(1982). Since the issue of legislative motivation was neither argued nor
briefed by the parties, the Court involved itself in impermissible fact finding
at the appellate level. It is no excuse to rely on the court of appeals' assump-
tion of discriminatory impact, for that court is equally disqualified to act as
fact finder. Most startling of all is the Supreme Court's blatant disregard of
its own well-founded advice: "Inquiries into [legislative] motives or pur-
poses are a hazardous matter .... What motivates one legislator to make a
speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to
enact it. . . ." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). See gener-
[Vol. 62:359
DENOMINATIONAL PREFERENCES
tics of various sects with a view towards 'religious gerrymander-
ing.' ",65 The Court, therefore, concluded that the Act promoted
excessive governmental entanglement with religion.
6 6
Hm. ANALYSIS
A. Discriminatory Intent
In Larson, the Court held that when a statute "discriminate [ s
among religions," 67 it must be closely fitted to the furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest.68 Perhaps the Larson decision
can best be conceptualized as requiring the equal protection of re-
ligions under the establishment clause. Since the Court employed
an equal protection mode of analysis, the question arises whether
there is an associated discriminatory intent requirement.
69 Al-
ally, Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation In Constitutional Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Note, The Establishment Clause and Religious Influ-
ences on Legislation, 75 NW. U.- REv. 940, 970-73 (1980).
65. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1688 (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 452 (1971)). In order to establish that a gerrymander had occurred, the
Unification Church had to demonstrate that there was an absence of a "neu-
tral, secular basis for the lines the government has drawn." Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437,452 (1971). The appellees in Larson have clearly met this
burden.
66. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1688. The court agreed "with the Court of
Appeals that the [unification church] ... should not automatically enjoy
[the] benefits [of a religious organization exemption] .... [A]ppellees may
be required by the state to prove that the Unification Church is a religious
organization within the meaning of the Act." Id. at 1689 n.30. However, Jus-
tice Stevens in his concurring opinion maintained that the burden was on the
state to prove that the Unification Church was not a religious organization.
Id. at 1689 (Stevens, J., concurring). The dissent took yet another tack and
opined that while the burden was on the state to prove that an organization is
charitable within the meaning of the registration requirements of MMN. STAT.
§ 309.52 (1980), the burden then shifted to the organization to prove that it fell
within the religious exemption of MiNN. STAT. § 309.515-1(b) (1980). Larson v.
Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1695 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist dissented from the majority.
Justice White felt that the Act did not discriminate on the basis of religious
belief and that no intent to discriminate could be found on the face of the Act.
He also opined that the line that Minnesota had drawn for its exemption was
valid and that exclusion of all religious organizations from the registration
and reporting requirements could be construed as a preference for a religious
over non-religious organizations and hence amount to an unconstitutional es-
tablishment of religion. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1691-93 (White, J.,
dissenting). See infra note 112 and accompanying text. Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice O'Connor and Justice White dis-
sented on the issue of standing. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1693-98
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra, note 40.
67. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1687.
68. Id.
69. The sine qua non of a discrimination case under the fourteenth amendment
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though the Court did not explicitly state that such an intent was
necessary to violate the establishment clause, the decision is re-
plete with suggestions that a discriminatory intent was, in fact,
present.70 Furthermore, Larson strongly implies that impermissi-
ble intent is a requirement for the invalidation of a challenged reg-
ulatory action.
71
The Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act did not call for differ-
ential treatment of religious organizations by name. Instead, the
state maintained that the Act was based, at least facially, on secu-
lar criteria.72 The inherent problem with such a statutory scheme
is that it opens the door for discrimination by the regulatory bodies
which are charged with implementation and enforcement of the
Act. The resultant hazard of subtle discriminatory administration
strikes fear into the hearts of all civil libertarians because of the
increased difficulty of adequately proving both differential im-
pact 73 and discriminatory intent when challenging an administra-
tive determination. Perhaps because of this danger, the Larson
Court fashioned its rule sufficiently broad so that even though a
statute may be facially neutral, it will, nevertheless, be examined
with strict scrutiny if its effect is to create a denominational
preference.
B. Compelling State Interest
The Larson Court did not specifically hold that the state's inter-
est in public disclosure of charitable solititations was a compelling
state interest.74 Considering the lack of difficulty the Larson Court
had in reaching its decision on this issue, it may be asked whether
equal protection clause is the presence of an impermissible discriminatory
intent. See, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). This requirement as-
sures that otherwise valid laws or classifications which merely have a differ-
ential impact will not be struck down at the behest of a plaintiff unless,
through the use of skewed statistics, legislative history, or discriminatory ad-
ministration, the aggrieved party is able to prove an intent to discriminate.
70. The Act makes "explicit and deliberate distinctions." Larson v. Valente, 102
S. Ct. at 1684 n.23. The Act "was drafted with the explicit intention of includ-
ing particular religious denominations and excluding others." Id. at 1688.
The Act's "express design [was] to burden or favor selected religious denom-
inations ... ." Id.
71. 'The Court appears to concede that the Minnesota law at issue does not con-
stitute an establishment of religion merely because it has a disparate impact.
An intentional preference must be expressed." Id. at 1692 (White, J.,
dissenting).
72. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3-5, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982).
73. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
74. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685. The court said that Minnesota's interest
was significant and, for the sake of argument, assumed the interest to be com-
pelling. Id.
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the state will ever be able to construct a sufficiently compelling
reason to discriminate among religions and contravene the estab-
lishment clause.
It may not be safe to assume that state interests which are com-
pelling in the context of free speech7 5 and free exercise 76 will also
suffice for purposes of the establishment clause, for a fundamental
distinction between the contexts in which the state interest arises
is evident. In the context of free speech and free exercise, regula-
tory actions generally infringe upon the acts that one may desire to
take to either pronounce his views or to support his beliefs. How-
ever, in cases like Larson, the state is not seeking to enjoin or mod-
ify acts which find their impetus in religious belief. Where the
state creates an official denominational preference, it does not in-
terfere with the right to act; it interferes with the underlying right
to believe. The majority opinion in Cantwell v. ConneCtiCut77 co-
gently stated this distinction.
The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom
of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individuals may choose cannot be restricted by law.
On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of
religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,--freedom to be-
lieve and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things,
the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the pro-
tection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to
preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, un-
duly to infringe the protected freedom.
78
It cannot be gainsaid that state sponsorship of one religion to
the exclusion of others or granting favored status to some sects
while burdening others creates in the mind of the citizens an in-
centive to believe in the favored sect while chilling those who hap-
pen to believe in the tenets of the sect that has fallen into official
disfavor. The continued vitality of the absolute component of the
first amendment, the establishment clause, assures that the sec-
ond concept embraced by the first amendment, free exercise, will
also be assured of the same exuberance. "Free exercise.., can be
guaranteed only when legislators-and voters-are required to ac-
cord to their own religions the very same treatment given to small,
75. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (interest in the orderly flow of
traffic).
76. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,311 (1940) ("clear and present danger").
77. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
78. Id. at 303-04.
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new, or unpopular denominations." 79 While the state may justifia-
bly infringe upon the right to act on one's beliefs for extremely lim-
ited purposes, the Court should never allow discrimination among
religions and thereby condone contravention of the more funda-
mental and absolute right to believe. By allowing such activities,
the Court would undoubtedly herald the death knell of the estab-
lishment clause as well as the demise of the free exercise clause.
C. A Tight Squeeze Into Close-Fittedness
In Larson, the state argued that the need for public disclosure
of financial information was directly related to the percentage of
funds obtained through public contributions.80 In essence, the
state maintained that whoever contributed the majority of the or-
ganization's funding should be entitled to discover the purposes
for which their contributions would be utilized. Since Minnesota
law provided for disclosure of such information to members of a
domestic nonprofit corporation,81 the need for public disclosure
was outweighed by the burdensome reporting requirements of the
Act unless the organization was primarily funded from public
donations. 82
In order to determine whether the Act was closely fitted to the
interest it assertedly served, the Supreme Court dissected the
state's argument into three premises. The acceptance of each as
valid was necessary to satisfy the close-fittedness standard.83 In
arriving at its construction of the first two premises,8 4 the Court
misconstrued the main thrust of the state's argument as well as
the central theme of the Act. Instead of recognizing that the Act
was directed toward disclosure of financial information, the Court
mistakenly assumed the main purpose of the Act to be supervision
and control of solicitation practices. The Minnesota Act addressed
as its main concern disclosure of and access to financial informa-
tion of charities to contributors; not, as the Court asserted, control
of solicitation practices.85 If the organization is funded primarily
from membership donations, membership disclosure of financial
information is sufficient and the need for public disclosure is out-
weighed by the burden imposed by the registration and reporting
79. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1683. See infra note 121.
80. Id. at 1685 (citing Brief for Appellants at 29).
81. See supra note 53.
82. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 567.
83. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685.
84. See supra text accompanying note 55.
85. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was able to recognize that the appel-
lants' primary concern was access to information by contributors and not
control per se. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 565, 567.
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requirements of the Act.86 Conversely, when a charitable organi-
zation becomes primarily publicly funded, public disclosure of its
finances is called for in order to inform those who contribute the
majority of the funds of the uses to which their contributions are
put.8
7
Although it may be argued that disclosure is superfluous be-
cause upon making a contribution the contributer has evidenced
his acquiescence to the organization's use of the funds, the argu-
ment loses force because the Court has found disclosure to be a
laudable goal. For example, in Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment,88 the Court realized the benefits accru-
ing to a populace which was informed about the uses of its charita-
ble contributions when it opined that "efforts to promote [public]
disclosure of the finances of charitable organizations may assist in
preventing fraud by informing the public of the ways in which
their contributions will be employed."89 The Act in Larson sought
to achieve the same goals as the Court touted in Schaumberg, yet
since the Court misconstrued the state's argument, it failed to rec-
ognize the Act's fundamental purpose.
When the Court analyzes whether a statute is closely fitted to
its purported purpose, it must be particularly careful not to mis-
construe the asserted state interest and strike down what may
otherwise be a valid statute.90 Such a standard of care on the
Court's behalf was not evident in the Larson decision.
Although the Court's construction of the first two premises was
clearly erroneous,91 the Court did not err in its analysis of the third
premise, namely that "the need for public disclosure rises in pro-
portion with the percentage of non-member contributions."92
The flaw in the appellants' reasoning may be illustrated by the following
example. Church A raises 410 million, 20 percent from non-members.
Church B raises $50,000, 60 percent from nonmembers. Appellants would
argue that although the public contributed $2 million to Church A and
only $30,000 to Church B, there is less need for public disclosure with re-
spect to Church A than with respect to Church B. We disagree; the need
for public disclosure more plausibly rises in proportion with absolute
86. Valente v. Larson, 637 F.2d at 567.
87. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685 (citing Brief for Appellants at 29).
88. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
89. Id. at 637-38 (footnote omitted). See also supra note 54.
90. Perhaps an overinclusive/underinclusive analysis could determine close-
fittedness equally as well as the method the Court utilized. The Court is not
a stranger to the use of such a test in adjudication regarding the establish-
ment clause. See, Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Byrne, 590 F.2d 514
(3d Cir.), affd, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
91. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
92. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685.
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amount, rather than with the percentage, of non-member contributions.
9 3
Regardless of whether the Act's main theme was, the disclosure
of financial information as the state maintained or supervision and
control of solicitation practices as the Court opined, the example
the Court utilized to determine the close-fittedness of the third
premise aptly demonstrated that the Act, as a whole, was not
closely fitted to its asserted interest. Therefore, while the Court's
analysis of close-fittedness is lacking a highly needed degree of
precision, which hopefully will be cured in subsequent decisions,
the resultant conclusion reached by the Court was undeniably
correct.
D. The New Brick In The Wall
In the main, the Court has avoided deciding issues which are
not absolutely necessary to the disposition of the controversy at
hand. This policy finds its impetus in the principle that the Court
should preclude the development of unforeseen complications by
deciding issues on the narrowest possible grounds. This reasoning
is equally applicable to the pronouncement of a new standard of
review where the utilization of a paradigm that has withstood the
test of time provides the means to reach the desired end.94 Such a
situation does not accord with "the Court's 'long and ... consid-
ered practice not to decide ... any constitutional question in ad-
vance of the necessity for its decision.' ,95
While strict scrutiny analysis is perhaps best suited to discern
those subtle nuances of discrimination 96 that accompany differen-
tial treatment of religions, the Court took great pains to point out
that while the Act was unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny
analysis,9 7 it also violated the third prong of the Lemon tests.9 8
The Court's methodology of finding the Act violative of the new
standard as well as the Lemon tests (a standard it held to be inap-
plicable in cases of discrimination among religions) 99 begs the
question of possible motivation on the Court's behalf.
Although it cannot be gainsaid that the principle of inter-
sectarian neutrality has long been a part of the establishment
93. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1686-87 (emphasis in original) (footnote omit-
ted). See also supra note 58.
94. Since the Court found the Act unconstitutional under the tripartite, disjunc-
tive test of Lemon, Larson v. Valente 102 S. Ct. at 1688, it could have entirely
avoided the pronouncement of the strict scrutiny standard.
95. Id. at 1693 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Alabama State Fed'n of Labor
v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1944)).
96. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
97. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1689.
98. Id. at 1688.
99. Id. at 1687.
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clause's decree, prior to Larson, the Court was never confronted
with a case framed as discrimination among religions. Despite this
fact, the Court attempted to justify its imposition of strict scrutiny
on the basis of precedent. "In short, when we are presented with a
state law granting a denominational preference, our precedents
demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict
scrutiny in adjudicating its constitutionality."10 0 The precedents
referred to were Everson v. Board of Education,1O1 Zorach v. Clau-
sen, 0 2 and Abington School District v. Schempp.l03 Simply stated,
none of these cases employ the strict scrutiny methodology, nor do
they involve discrimination among religions.l0 4
Since the Court's asserted reason for the application of strict
scrutiny was less than compelling, the inquiry must shift and focus
on those motivations which may not be so blatantly stated. Al-
though it may be possible that the Court found the church's argu-
ments so convincing that they were entirely subsumed within the
opinion,105 it appears much more plausible that the Court was sim-
ply cognizant that interdenominational neutrality demands the
100. Id. at 1684.
101. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
102. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
103. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
104. Zorach held that the release of students from public schools, upon parental
request, for religious observation and instruction did not work an establish-
ment of religion and that, in fact, the release was required in order to accom-
modate the free exercise of religion. Everson approved a state scheme
whereby parents were reimbursed for bus fares for children attending both
public and parochial educational institutions. Abington School District held
that Bible reading in public schools was an unconstitutional establishment of
religion. Regarding the standard of review employed in these establishment
clause cases preceding the utilization of the tests summarized in Lemon, no
common discernible thread of reasoning can be found to justify the results
reached by the Court. Careful studying of the cases cited by the Larson
Court as precedent reveals that if there is indeed a discernible standard com-
mon to all, it is not the methodology used in a modern strict scrutiny analysis.
See supra note 12; infra note 122.
105. For example, the appellees argued that "the Lemon tests were designed pri-
marily to evaluate the constitutionality of governmental programs providing
benefits to all religious organizations." Brief for Appellees at 31, Larson v.
Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court
agreed with the appellees' position. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1687. In
addition, while the Church argued that the Act should be "invalidated unless
justified by, and closely fitted to, a substantial governmental interest," Brief
for Appellees at 23, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982), the Court held
that the Act " must be invalidated unless it is justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest, and unless it is closely fitted to further that interest." Larson
v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685 (citations omitted). Furthermore, the premises
constructed from the state's argument by the Church strangely parallel those
gleaned by the Court. Compare Brief for Appellees at 23-28, Larson v. Va-
lente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982), with Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1685-87.
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mode of analysis employed in all other equal protection cases:
strict scrutiny. Credence is lended to this supposition when the
Court stated that "there is no more effective practical guarantee
against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require
that the principles of law which officials would impose upon a mi-
nority must be imposed generally."' 06 Employment of the equal
protection, strict scrutiny, standard in the establishment clause
context assures the continued vitality of not only its core neutral-
ity precept but the free exercise clause as welll0 7 and leaves all
sects free to compete for adherents solely according to the appeal
of their dogma and free from the confounding variable of official
state favoritism.
E. Future Implications of Larson
Perhaps the most important and immediate impact of the Lar-
son decision will be on state laws which regulate charitable solici-
tation. Those statutes, which on their face, call for differential
treatment of religious organizations are prime candidates for judi-
cial review under the strict scrutiny test of Larson.OS Judging
from Minnesota's failure to demonstrate that the Act was closely
fitted to a compelling state interest, it is extremely doubtful that
other states will fare much better.0 9
The Court held that the Lemon tests "[were] intended to apply
to laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions, and not to provi-
sions... that discriminate among religions."" 0 The Court's cryp-
tic language creates an ambiguity and possible uncertainty as to
which standard of review is applicable in a given situation.
At first blush it would seem that the only context in which a law
is uniformly beneficial is that of state aid to religions, such as mon-
etary and material aid to sectarian schools, or tuition tax credits
and deductions to the parents of children attending such
schools.I Nevertheless, any form of public aid to sectarian educa-
106. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1683-84. The identical quotation can be found
in the Brief of Appellees at 20, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
108. See Note, State Regulation of Public Solicitation for Religious Purposes, 16
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 996 (1980). See also, Heritage Village Church and Mis-
sionary Fellowship v. North Carolina, 40 N.C. App. 429, 253 S.E.2d 473 (1979),
affid, 299 N.C. 399, 263 S.E.2d 727 (1980) (The court struck down a North Caro-
lina statute essentially identical to the Act at issue in Larson because it
worked an establishment. The statute exempted religious organizations
soliciting primarily, i.e., greater than 50 percent, from members.).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
110. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. at 1687 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
111. In Mueller v. Allen, 676 F.2d 1195 (8th Cir. 1982), the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota's income tax deduction
[Vol. 62:359
DENOMINATIONAL PREFERENCES
tional institutions would not uniformly benefit all religions since it
would specifically except and thereby discriminate against those
religious organizations which do not maintain educational facili-
ties. However, it is doubtful that the Court would find such an
analysis convincing since the argument is akin to the argument
that exemption of all religions from solicitation registration re-
quirements works an establishment of religions over nonreligious
organizations. Assertions analogous to the latter argument have
consistently been dismissed,11 2 and it is likely that the former
would be rejected as well.
for elementary and secondary school tuition did not violate the establishment
clause. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.09(22) (West Supp. 1983) provides for a tax
deduction of $500 per elementary school student and $700 per secondary
school student for actual expenses incurred for tuition, textbooks, and trans-
portation in both public and sectarian educational institutions. 676 F.2d at
1196 n.2. The Court held that the statute did not violate the Lemon tests be-
cause the primary effect of the statute was not to support and advance reli-
gion since the statute had a valid secular purpose in that it provided a tax
benefit to all taxpayers.
The court distinguished the Minnesota statute from the New York statute
the Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), since the New York statute
operated as a tax credit for parents whose children attended private schools
rather than a tax deduction for all parents as in Mueller. Although the Muel-
ler court recognized that the tax deduction may provide an incentive to enroll
children in sectarian educational institutions, the benefit thereby accruing to
those institutions is too remote to support the plaintiff's contention that the
statute violated the primary effect test of Lemon. Since the aid in question
here is uniformly beneficial to all schools the proper standard of review is the
Lemon tests.
112. The argument that the exclusion of all religious organizations from regulation
(to the chagrin of non-religious organizations) is a preference for religious
over non-religious organizations an therefore constitutes an impermissible
establishment of religion has been made in the past. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cath-
olic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 518 n.1l (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 80-85 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 220-21 (1972); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 338-40 (1970) (plurality
opinion); Id. at 344-61 (Harlan, J., concurring); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664, 700-27 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 165 (1965); id. at 188 (Douglas, J., concurring); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 442 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting); King's Garden, Inc., v. FCC 498
F.2d 51,56-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974); Kurland, Of Church
and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 22-26, 96 (1961). This
type of argument has never been considered by the Court to be meritorious.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1433 (1981) (work on tank
turrets); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (compulsory educa-
tion); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448-60 (1971) (conscription); Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemption for religious in-
stitutions); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409-10 (1963) (unemployment
compensation for Sabbatarians); the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366,
389-90 (1918) (conscription).
Since a blanket exemption from regulation is uniformly beneficial to all
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When the Larson Court held that the Lemon tests were appli-
cable to those laws which uniformly aid or benefit all religions, the
Court probably meant to use those words in their ordinary mean-
ing and did not intend the attenuated meaning placed on them by
an argument that supposes discrimination because a religion
chooses not to maintain an educational institution.
Lemon v. Kurtzman"13 is a case which illustrates the ambiguity
in the Court's choice of language. In Lemon, the Court considered
the constitutionality of Rhode Island's Salary Supplement Act"4
which provided for a fifteen percent salary supplement to teachers
in non-public schools.n5 At first impression it would appear that
such a statute would be properly judged under the Lemon tests
since the benefit seems to be uniformly accorded to all religions.
However, because the only beneficiaries under the Rhode Island
Act were 250 teachers in Roman Catholic schools,116 the Act was
discriminatory in both administration and effect and an intent to
discriminate could easily be found. The only proper standard of
review would therefore be strict scrutiny.
The Rhode Island Act in Lemon is clearly within the Court's
meaning when it spoke of uniform aid or benefit, yet perhaps since
there is evidence of both discriminatory effect and intent, strict
scrutiny should be implemented. Because of the inherent dangers
that tread closely behind the footsteps of discrimination among re-
ligions the use of the higher standard of review, strict scrutiny, is
demanded by the best reading of the Larson decision.
In cases of state aid to sectarian educational institutions (ab-
sent the rare exigent circumstances similar to those in Lemon
which would militate in favor of strict scrutiny), the tripartite, dis-
junctive test of Lemon retain utility. Conversely, where discrimi-
nation among religions is evident, strict scrutiny will be the proper
standard of review. Recently, however, the establishment clause
and its prohibitions against organized religious activity in the pub-
lic school have come under attack. Efforts are afoot to legislatively
reinstate prayer in the public schools." 7 Although such efforts
religions the proper standard of review would be the Lemon tests and not the
strict scrutiny of Larson.
113. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
114. IL GEN. LAws §§ 16-5-1 to 16-5-17 (Supp. 1970).
115. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 607.
116. Id. at 608.
117. For example, ALa. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1982) entitled "School Prayer"
provides:
From henceforth, any teacher or profesor in any public educational
institution within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord
God is one, at the beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray,
[Vol. 62:359
DENOMINATIONAL PREFERENCES
have traditionally been analyzed via the Lemon tests, strict scru-
tiny may well be the proper standard.
In Engle v. Vitale1 8 the Court held that the recitation of a
twenty-two word nondenominational Regent's prayer worked an
unconstitutional establishment of religion since it involved more
than the objective study of religion. It cannot be gainsaid that the
establishment of an official denominational preference of Christi-
anity necessarily discriminates against those religions which are
not similarly favored, and it chills the right of free exercise and the
right to believe as one so chooses. The intent of legislative acts
which call for sectarian worship in tax supported educational insti-
tutions is an intent to discriminate against non-Christian religions.
Such a discriminatory intent may be found on the face of the legis-
lative provision, through the examination of legislative history, or
through a refusal by officials to consider the official implementa-
tion of prayers of those religious sects which do not share the Prot-
estant majority's belief in Christ.
Therefore, if an intent to discriminate among religions can be
demonstrated, the strict scrutiny test of Larson is brought to the
forefront of the inquiry."9 It cannot be denied that in the context
of religion in the schools the state will never be able to construct a
compelling state interest120 which would justify the violation of the
establishment clause's core neutrality precept.121 With the Court's
may lead willing students in prayer, or may lead the willing students
in the following prayer to God.
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as
the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world. May Your justice, Your
truth, and Your peace abound this day in the hearts of our country-
men, in the counsels of our government, in the sanctity of our homes
and in the classrooms of our schools in the name of our Lord. Amen.
See infra note 120.
118. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
119. This reasoning is equally applicable to other cases the Court has considered.
See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (state law prohibited the
teaching of evolution); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the classroom).
120. "[I]t is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for
any group of the American people to recite as part of a religious program
carried on by government." Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962) (emphasis
added). See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
121. Local governments would do well to take note of the Larson decision. Relig-
iously oriented Christmas observances, including governmental promotion of
Christianity by erecting a creche, necessarily discriminate against those who
do not share a belief in Christ.
Larson makes clear that because of the City's ownership and use
of the nativity scene is an act which discriminates between Christian
and non-Christian religions it must be evaluated under the test of
strict scrutiny.
... [D]efendants established no compelling governmental inter-
est in erection of the nativity scene. If one is unable to demonstrate
19831
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
holding that strict scrutiny under the establishment clause is man-
dated where discrimination exists among religions, the Court has
not overruled any precedent; it has, however, pronounced a uni-
formly applicable standard to use in the context of religious obser-
vations in public schools and statutory provisions which call for
differential treatment on the basis of religious beliefs, sectarian af-
filiation, or solicitation practices.
IV. CONCLUSION
To the average citizen or state legislator the Larson decision
means that the state control of "Moonies" or other soliciting cults
will be difficult to achieve and that legislation proposing prayer in
public schools will not obtain the Supreme Court's approval. For
the constitutional lawyer, however, the higher standard of review
that strict scrutiny provides means that the courts will be able to
differentiate the subtle nuances of discrimination that invariably
accompany governmental regulatory actions and legislative acts
which are not facially discriminatory. Furthermore, and perhaps
most importantly, the strict scrutiny standard will assure the con-
tinued vitality of not only the absolutist component of the estab-
lishment clause, but by so doing, it also assures that the same
degree of vitality will be enjoyed by the free exercise clause. The
Lemon tests will remain the proper standard of review in the con-
text of uniform benefit to all religions.
Since courts are familiar with the application of strict scrutiny
in other areas of constitutional law such as equal protection, free-
dom of speech, and free exercise of religious beliefs, the Larson
inquiry lends a high degree of familiarity to adjudication of the is-
sues involved in establishment clause cases. Unfortunately, how-
any legitimate purpose or interest, it is hardly necessary to inquire
whether a compelling purpose or interest can be shown. We con-
clude therefore that the first prong of strict scrutiny test is not met,
and of course find it unnecessary to address the second prong.
Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original). See
supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
Local school boards should also be aware of the Larson decision. Indeed,
it appears that even the revered baccalaureate exercises at high school and
college graduations throughout the country are of dubious constitutionality.
Baccalareate is defined as "an address or sermon delivered at commence-
ment." WEBsTER's NEw WoRLD DICIONARY 101 (2d college ed. 1976). Many
baccalaureates are replete with all the splendor accorded traditional Protes-
tant church services including the singing of hymns, the display of the Latin
cross, and a sermon. These tax supported services, which are usually held in
public schools, are sectarian in nature and unconstitutional as well since they
discriminate against those holding non-Christian beliefs. They establish pre-
cisely the sort of official denominational preferences that the Framers of our
Constitution forbade.
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ever, with its pronouncement that strict scrutiny is the proper
standard where the Lemon tests also serve to reach the identical
and correct result, the Court has entangled itself in reprehensible
judicial policy and created obfuscation as to which test is applica-
ble in some limited situations. On the other hand, perhaps the
new standard of review will lend a much needed, more discernable
standard to cases in which none could previously be found. 2 2
Daniel W. Evans '83
122. One commentator has suggested that the religion clause cases cannot be ra-
tionalized, saying that the Court has "tread a narrow path, moving right or
left as the Justices' personal predilections and fears moved them." Kurland,
The Supreme Cour4 Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Reli-
gion Clauses, 75 W. VA. L. REv. 213, 244 (1973).
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